Is TTIP going to be sacrificed to save CETA? That's one interpretation of what's going on right now:
German economy minister Sigmar Gabriel triggered a bit of a panic this weekend when he said the talks for a trade accord with the United States have “de facto failed, even though nobody is really admitting it.”
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Gabriel not only faces opposition from the far left but from within his own party, which is governing in a grand coalition with Angela Merkel’s conservatives.
Politico reports that many Social Democrats are no less skeptical of a trade agreement with Canada, which has already been negotiated and is pending ratification by the EU’s member states.
According to Politico, Gabriel has to tread a tightrope by opposing TTIP while backing the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with Canada.
In other words: opposing the treaty with the Americans — which is as good as dead anyway — may just give Gabriel the leeway he needs to wave through the agreement with Canada.
At the same time, there is now a constitutional challenge against CETA in German court. Here's a summary of the claims:
4. Unconstitutional elements of the agreement
The complaining parties justify their constitutional complaint with four facts which are, in their opinion, unconstitutional:
a) Committees: CETA provides for the establishment of a committee structure. The central committee (“CETA Joint Committee”) is authorized to unilaterally enact procedure provisions and even undertake contract modifications. The contracting states have to submit to these decisions. This power is assigned solely to the CETA Joint Committee, i.e. without a national procedure or the approval of the contract states being envisaged. The non-participation of German governmental representatives in the CETA Joint Committee is unconstitutional.
b) Investment courts: Canadian companies can invoke what is known as investment courts to sue the German state or Bundesländer and local authorities for damages if they consider the cost-effectiveness of their companies to be affected by state measures. This creates an inadmissible parallel justice and creates discrimination against German companies, as only foreign investors can claim damages from the state.
c) The “precautionary principle” as a core element of the European regulatory policy is legally not sufficiently safeguarded in CETA. In the past, improvements to health protection in environmental, consumer and food policy were in part successfully based on the precautionary principle. This applies, for instance, to the European Chemicals Regulation “REACH”. Under the CETA agreement such a regulation would be practically excluded were one to follow the stipulations of the agreement.
d) Provisional application: CETA is what is known as a “mixed agreement” that affects not only EU competences, but also the competences of the national states and therefore makes ratification by the parliaments of the EU Member States necessary. The European Commission and the EU Member States have also declared that they want to “provisionally apply” CETA. The agreement is therefore already supposed to enter into force before the national parliaments have agreed on acceptance. The provisional application will continue to apply until ratification has been “finally” concluded. This could take years. The consequence is that citizens are exposed to the negative effects of the agreement without the agreement having been democratically adopted. It is irrelevant whether the whole agreement or only part of it are provisionally applied. One discussed possibility is that only the parts of CETA that apply to EU competences alone will be provisionally applied. However, the trading policy that falls under EU competence can lead to irreversible negative consequences for people, e.g. as a result of a disregard for the precautionary principle. Therefore, provisional application is out of the question.
So whose domestic trade politics are messier right now, the U.S. or the EU? It's a close call.
