Following up on my blog post of earlier today, this is from Tilman Krueger:
the EU actively contributes to rule development in the WTO also as a litigant in the context of WTO dispute settlement and in addition to its immediate, case-specific interests. Two examples for such behaviour will now be illustrated.
Although initiated by its goal to eliminate zeroing, the EU’s strategic targeting of US dumping calculations as claimant and as third party, and its continued insistence on the precedential effects of the Appellate Body’s case law motivated the Appellate Body to assume a stronger role for itself. Together with US noncompliance, this provoked a showdown situation between a panel and the Appellate Body – over the legality of zeroing as well as over the status of adopted Appellate Body reports in the WTO’s legal system. With the adoption of the Appellate Body’s report in US – Stainless Steel (Mexico), the EU could then claim a double win with reference to both, its immediate, case-specific interests on zeroing as well as its long-term, systemic interests on the establishment of a stronger court system in the WTO.
His second example is opening AB hearings to the public.
The passage is from a chapter, entitled "Shaping the WTO’s institutional evolution: the EU as a strategic litigant in the WTO," in this book: http://www.cambridge.org/de/academic/subjects/law/european-law/european-unions-shaping-international-legal-order